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In Gaussian quantum key distribution eavesdropping attacks are conventionally modeled through the univer-
sal entangling cloner scheme, which is based on the premise that the whole environment is under control of
the adversary, i.e., the eavesdropper purifies the system. This assumption implies that the eavesdropper has
either access to an identity (noiseless) channel or infinite amount of entanglement in order to simulate such an
identity channel. In this work, we challenge the necessity of this assumption, and we propose a teleportation-
based eavesdropping attack, where the eavesdropper is not assumed to have access to the shared channel, that
represents the unavoidable noise due to the environment. Under collective measurements, this attack reaches
optimality in the limit of infinite amount of entanglement, while for finite entanglement resources it outperforms
the corresponding optimal individual attack. We also calculate the minimum amount of distributed entangle-
ment that is necessary for this eavesdropping scheme, since we consider it as the operationally critical quantity
capturing the limitations of a realistic attack. We conclude that the fact that infinite amount of entanglement
is required for an optimal collective eavesdropping attack signifies the robustness of Gaussian quantum key
distribution.
Introduction. Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) [1–3] is
one of the most prominent quantum communication proto-
cols, which enables two parties to establish a shared (random)
secret key for cryptographic purposes. It was originally de-
veloped for discrete-variable (DV) quantum systems [4, 5],
but has also been extended to the continuous-variable (CV)
regime [6–8]. A clear advantage of the CV-QKD schemes
over their DV counterparts is the low-cost telecom optical
components needed, which are already available for classical
communication.
We generally consider the following assumptions for an
eavesdropper (Eve) in a QKD scheme [1–3]: (i) Eve has full
access to the quantum channel between Alice and Bob, (ii)
Eve has unlimited computational power, (iii) Eve can monitor
the public classical channel, but she cannot modify the mes-
sages (authenticated channel), and (iv) Eve has no access to
Alice’s and Bob’s laboratories.
The most powerful attack Eve can asymptotically perform
is the so-called collective attack [9], where she prepares and
interacts a set of individual and identical quantum systems
with the quantum signals sent from Alice to Bob. She then
stores the output ensemble into her quantum memory for a fu-
ture collective measurement (an individual attack would rely
on individual measurements respectively). Unconditional se-
curity of a QKD protocol can be achieved by upper bounding
the information Eve can extract, also known as the Holevo
bound [10].
The question we answer in the context of Gaussian QKD in
this letter is the following: can Eve optimally attack the sys-
tem under collective measurements without having access to
the quantum channel between Alice and Bob? In other words,
we investigate the necessity of the first assumption (discussed
before) regarding Eve’s capabilities. We conclude that it is in-
deed not necessary for Eve to have access to the channel in
order to collectively attack a system as long as she can per-
form an all-optical teleportation [11] over it. In particular,
we propose a teleportation-based eavesdropping scheme that
serves as an alternative type of attack to the well-known entan-
gling cloner [12–14] that assumes Eve’s access to the shared
quantum channel.
We further discuss how, under this scheme, Eve’s informa-
tion depends on the amount of entanglement she can prepare,
distribute and distill in order to successfully perform the all-
optical teleportation protocol [11] (see Refs.[15–21] for dif-
ferent types of quantum teleportation). Employing collective
measurements, and using a resource state with the least re-
quired amount of entanglement, Eve’s information reaches the
bound for optimal individual attacks [22, 23]. Using the same
setup and taking the limit to infinite entanglement for the re-
source state, Eve’s information approaches the ultimate bound
for an eavesdropping attack, also known as the Holevo bound
[10].
We identify the distributed entanglement used as a resource
for teleportation as the operationally critical quantity captur-
ing the limitations of a realistic Eve (e.g. for a given separa-
tion of Alice and Bob one can estimate a minimum amount of
loss, and Eve’s quantum information processing resources that
bound the amount of pure entanglement that could be distilled
across such a lossy channel). Under this limitation we evalu-
ate the secret key rate that Alice and Bob achieve conditioned
on their belief on how powerful (in entanglement resources)
Eve is. Note that other types of physical limitations on Eve’s
capabilities for CV-QKD systems have also been studied in
the context of Eve’s restricted quantum memory [24], and
Eve’s restriction to receive all the photons lost in transmission
[25]
Gaussian CV-QKD. A generic QKD protocol in prepare-
and-measure (PM) scheme consists of: (i) quantum communi-
cation, where one party (Alice) encodes classical information
into conjugate quantum basis states, which are sent through an
insecure quantum channel to another party (Bob), who mea-
sures the received quantum states in a randomly chosen basis,
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2resulting in two sets of correlated data between Alice and Bob,
and (ii) classical communication (also called classical post-
processing) over a public but authenticated classical channel,
where Alice and Bob extract a secret key from the correlated
data they collected during the previous step.
In a fully Gaussian CV-QKD protocol [26, 27] (in the PM
scheme) Alice encodes a classical random variable “a” (drawn
from a Gaussian distribution) onto Gaussian quantum states,
squeezed states [28] or coherent states [29], and sends them
through an insecure quantum channel to Bob, who measures
the received quantum states using homodyne or heterodyne
detection to obtain a classical random variable “b”.
Gaussian (collective or individual) attacks are asymptot-
ically optimal [30–33], and the asymptotic secret key rate
against optimal collective attacks is given by [34, 35]
K = βI(a:b)− S(x:E) , (1)
where I(a:b) is the classical mutual information between Al-
ice and Bob, and S(x:E) is the maximum mutual informa-
tion between Alice (x≡a) and Eve (in the direct reconciliation
where Alice is the reference of the reconciliation in the clas-
sical post-processing), or between Bob (x≡b) and Eve (in the
reverse reconciliation where Bob is the reference of the rec-
onciliation). The coefficient 0 6 β 6 1 is the reconciliation
efficiency [36, 37]. Note that the maximum amount of infor-
mation Eve can possibly extract from the collective attack is
upper bounded by the Holevo bound χ(x:E) [10], i.e.,
S(x:E) 6 χ(x:E) . (2)
Gaussian states [27, 38–40] σˆ are the ones that can be
fully characterized by the mean value and the variance of the
quadrature field operators qˆ := (xˆ1, pˆ1, . . . , xˆn, pˆn)T , with
xˆj := aˆj + aˆ
†
j and pˆj := i(aˆ
†
j − aˆj), where aˆj and aˆ†j are the
annihilation and creation operators, respectively. Without los-
ing generality we assume that the mean value is zero and the
state can be fully described by a real, symmetric and positive-
definite matrix called the covariance matrix, whose arbitrary
element is given by σij = 12 〈{qˆi, qˆj}〉. The covariance matrix
in the standard form [41, 42] is given by
σsf =
[
A C
C B
]
, (3)
with A = diag(a,a), B = diag(b,b) and C = diag(c+,c−),
where a > b and c+ > |c−| > 0. A two-mode squeezed
vacuum has a = b = 1+ζ
2
1−ζ2 and c− = −c+ = 2ζ1−ζ2 . With
0 6 ζ < 1 we denote the squeezing parameter. The co-
variance matrix transformation for a two-mode Gaussian state
σin passing through a single-mode phase-insensitive Gaussian
channel G is given by [43]
σout = G(σin) = (1⊕ U)σin(1⊕ U)T + (0⊕ V ) , (4)
where U =
√
τ1, with τ > 0 representing the transmissivity
or the gain, and V = v1, with v = |1− τ |ε > 0 representing
the additive noise (ε = 1 for pure and ε > 1 for thermal
channels, respectively).
Let us assume that Alice and Bob identify in their in-
between interaction a phase-insensitive channel G, that we
assume to be a thermal lossy channel with transmissivity
0 < τ < 1 and noise v = (1 − τ)ε, but the result can
be trivially extended to any non-entanglement-breaking [44]
phase-insensitive channel.
Each Gaussian PM scheme can be represented using an
equivalent entanglement-based scheme [26], where Alice pre-
pares a pure Gaussian entangled state, i.e., a two-mode
squeezed vacuum state σin with squeezing parameter 0 < ζ <
1, keeping one mode while sending the second mode through
the quantum channel. If Alice applies a homodyne (hetero-
dyne) detection, the second mode of the entangled states is
projected onto a squeezed (coherent) state. While in the ex-
perimental demonstration of CV-QKD, PM scheme is pre-
ferred, the entanglement-based scheme is favored for the se-
curity analysis. Before we propose our scheme, let us briefly
review the current way we model individual/collective attacks.
Universal Entangling Cloner Attack. In the entangling
cloner setup [12–14], the whole channel G is associated with
a potential eavesdropper that has full control of the environ-
ment. Eve uses a two-mode squeezed vacuum state and mixes
one arm of it with Alice’s signal in a beam-splitter with trans-
missivity equal to the transmissivity of the quantum channel.
For the collective attack, one of the outputs is sent directly
to Bob while the rest are stored in her quantum memory. Fi-
nally, she collectively measures the stored ensemble to gain
the maximum information about the distributed key. This
scheme is schematically represented in Fig. 1.
An assumption that has been taken in this setup is that Eve
is able to noiselessly transmit the output signal of the beam-
splitter to Bob, i.e., the output signal passes through an iden-
tity channel 1. Obviously, this is a really strong assumption,
since Eve has to deal with some unavoidable decoherence
due to environmental reasons that go beyond her control, but
even theoretically that is impossible because simulating iden-
tity channels through teleportation in CV systems requires an
infinite amount of entanglement.
For the case of optimal individual attacks it has already
been shown [22, 23] that they can be realistically modeled
through the standard CV-teleportation protocol [18], however
this protocol is dependent on individual Bell-type measure-
ments, and thus it cannot be directly used for collective at-
tacks. In order to realistically model an optimal collective
attack, we propose below an eavesdropping scheme, based on
the all-optical teleportation protocol [11] that is measurement-
free.
All-optical Teleportation Attack. In this type of attack,
that is schematically represented in Fig. 1, we start by assum-
ing that there exists a physical quantum channel, G, between
Alice and Bob, through which all the participants (including
Eve) must send their signals. Given this limitation, Eve (who
is allowed to establish stations arbitrarily close to Alice’s and
Bob’s laboratories) performs an all-optical teleportation pro-
3FIG. 1. Eavesdropping attack. On the top panel we present the en-
tangling cloner attack, where Eve has full control of the environment
and simulates the channel G through a beam-splitter Bτ (with the
same transmissivity as the channel). One input of the beam-splitter
is Alice’s signal and the other is one arm of Eve’s state ϕ′. With
M1−2 we represent the measurements that Eve performs later on her
quantum memory on her state µ′, and 1 the identity channel. On the
bottom panel, we present the all-optical teleportation attack. In this
attack, Eve has no access to the quantum channel G and she performs
an all-optical teleportation over the signal sent from Alice. With ρ
we denote Eve’s resource state. The all-optical teleportation con-
sists of a two-mode squeezer Sg with gain g, which is in Eve’s first
station close to Alice’s laboratory, and a beam-splitter Bt with trans-
missivity t = 1/g, which is in Eve’s second station close to Bob’s
laboratory (see supplemental material for more information about the
all-optical teleportation). One mode of Eve’s resource state ρ is sent
to the first station as an input of Sg . The other mode of ρ is sent to
the second station and is mixed on a beam-splitter Bη with another
state ϕ, before it becomes an input to Bt. Finally Eve performs the
measurements M1−3 on her state µ that was stored in the quantum
memory. For a pure channel G, both the entangling cloner and the
all-optical teleportation attack need to substitute the state ϕ with a
single-mode vacuum state |0〉.
tocol [11] over this channel G (details about this type of tele-
portation can be found in the supplemental material). In gen-
eral, any Gaussian channel can be simulated via a quantum
teleportation protocol using an appropriate resource state [45–
47]. Given a Gaussian phase-insensitive channel G the set of
all resource states that can simulate it have been derived in
Ref. [48] (see also Ref. [49] for special cases).
For our purposes, we assume that Eve can prepare, dis-
tribute and distill a pure two-mode squeezed vacuum state ρ
with squeezing parameter 0 6 γ < 1. One arm of it is used
for the initial amplification (performed on Eve’s station close
to Alice’s side) through the two-mode squeezer Sg with gain
g > 1 [50]. Employing a beam-splitter Bη with transmissiv-
ity 0 6 η 6 1, we mix the second arm of ρ with one arm
of another two-mode squeezed vacuum state ϕ with squeez-
ing parameter 0 6 κ < 1 (that is prepared and used on Eve’s
station close to Bob’s side). One output of Bη is headed to
another beam-splitter Bt with transmissivity t = 1/g for the
final attenuation of the signal before it is forwarded to Bob.
The final step for Eve is to perform a collective measure-
ment on the modes that she has stored in her quantum mem-
ory, that we denote as a quantum state µ. Theoretically, the
maximum information that she can extract from those mea-
surements is given by [26]
S(x:E) = S(µ)− S(µ|x) , (5)
where S(·) denotes the von Neumann entropy, that can be cal-
culated through the symplectic eigenvalues νi of a N -mode
state [27, 39, 51], via
S(σ) :=
N∑
i=1
νi + 1
2
log2
νi + 1
2
− νi − 1
2
log2
νi − 1
2
, (6)
and S(µ|x) is the von Neumann entropy for Eve’s quantum
system conditioned on Alice or Bob’s measurement.
The challenging part for Eve is to prepare, distribute and
distill pure entangled states ρ over the corresponding dis-
tance between Alice and Bob. Thus, we assess her perfor-
mance through the amount of entanglement of her state ρ. The
least amount of entanglement needed for the simulation of the
channel G [48], and consecutively for any teleportation-based
attack is given by
E(ρ) > E(γmin) , (7)
where
γmin =
2
√
τ −√(v + 1− τ)(v − 1 + τ)
τ + v + 1
, (8)
with E being the entropy of entanglement [52], given by
E(γ) := 2γ
2 log2 γ +
(
1− γ2) log2(1− γ2)
(γ2 − 1) ln 2 . (9)
The reason we employ the entropy of entanglement to quan-
tify the entanglement of the resource state ρ is because it is
assumed to be pure. However, any proper entanglement mea-
sure, e.g., entanglement of formation [52], relative entropy of
entanglement [53], squashed entanglement [54] etc, reduces
to Eq. (9) for pure states.
We should note that for a pure loss channel G the two-mode
squeezed vacuum state ϕ is reduced to a single-mode vacuum
|0〉 for both the entangling cloner and the all-optical telepor-
tation attack.
Discussion. For our numerical calculations we consider
an entanglement-based CV-QKD protocol, where both Al-
ice and Bob apply heterodyne detection on their entangled
modes. The left plot of Fig. 2 shows Eve’s information for
this protocol in the reverse reconciliation scenario, calculated
via Eq. (5) and maximized over the parameters {η, κ} that can
simulate the channel G, as a function of the entanglement of
4FIG. 2. Eve’s information and key rate. We assume that the quantum channel that Alice and Bob initially share is a thermal loss channel
G with transmissivity equal to τ = 0.25, corresponding to approximately 30km of optical fiber assuming about 0.2dB/km loss, and additive
noise ε = 1.01. Alice’s state is a two-mode squeezed vacuum with squeezing parameter ζ = 0.7, and the reconciliation efficiency is set equal
to β = 0.95 [55, 56]. Alice and Bob measure their modes with heterodyne detection, and Eve performs an all-optical teleportation attack in
the limit of g → ∞ (The protocol works for finite amount of gain g as well but with less success for Eve). In figure (a) with the solid blue
line we plot the amount of information S(b:E) Eve can extract in the reverse reconciliation scenario against the entanglement of her pure
resource state E(ρ), parametrized over the squeezing parameter γ [see Eq. (9)]. The minimum value of entanglement E(γmin) corresponds to
about 4.2dB of squeezing. The horizontal red dashed line represents the Holevo bound χ(b:E), that is the maximum amount of information
an eavesdropper can physically extract. In the limit of infinite entanglement, i.e., E(γ → 1)→∞, we see that this bound is reached. With the
green dot-dashed line we indicate the maximum amount of information Eve can extract through an optimal individual attack [22, 23]. In figure
(b) we have the corresponding key rate that Alice and Bob measure given Eve’s collective attack. Again, the red dashed line is the minimum
possible key rate that they can extract, and the green dot-dashed represents the key rate based on the optimal individual attack. In both plots
we indicate the non-physical areas with grey color.
state ρ. Let us mention here that in case of a pure loss channel
G there is no need for an optimization, since the transmissivity
can be just set equal to η = τ/γ2. The value for the Holevo
bound that Eve has to reach is given by [26]
χ = S(σout)− S(σout|b) , (10)
where S(σout|b) is the von Neumann entropy of the entan-
gled state shared between Alice and Bob conditioned on Bob’s
measurement.
The right plot of Fig. 2 shows the achievable secret key rate
calculated by Alice and Bob, based on Eq. (1) and the mutual
information, which for this protocol is given by
I(a:b) = log2
aτ + v + 1
τ + v + 1
. (11)
We also plot the corresponding values for Eve’s information
and secret key rate under an optimal individual attack [22, 23].
We observe that when Eve uses the minimum required amount
of entanglement resources, i.e., E(γmin), the attack reduces to
the optimal individual attack. At this point, the beam-splitter
Bη is not interacting with the signal, i.e., η = 1, and the pa-
rameter κ becomes irrelevant.
Eve’s information monotonically increases with the amount
of entanglement, and it approaches the Holevo bound in the
limit of infinite entanglement, i.e., E(γ→1) → ∞. In this
extreme point, the beam-splitter Bη has transmissivity equal
to the channel’s transitivity, i.e., η = τ , and the state ϕ has
a squeezing parameter κ =
√
(ε− 1)/(ε+ 1). It is worth
noting that the teleportation part of the protocol at this stage
is operating under the Choi-state [57] (maximally entangled
state sent through the channel).
The notion of optimality in the extreme case of infinite en-
tanglement E(γ→1)→∞ is justified by the fact that a phys-
ical bound is reached i.e., the Holevo bound, that we cannot
surpass. A meaningful question to ask at this point may be the
following: for a given finite amount of entanglement what is
the optimal collective attack? To this day, a physical limit that
upper bounds the amount of classical information that can be
extracted from a quantum channel under the use of finite en-
tanglement has not been established. Thus, even though the
scheme proposed in this letter seems to operate optimally for
any value of entanglement, we will forgo making such a strong
claim.
Note that the key rate calculated in Fig. 2 is for the asymp-
totic regime. However, if we include the finite-size effects
[58, 59], there would be some circumstances that while posi-
tive finite key rates cannot be generated from optimal collec-
tive attacks [under the unrealistic assumption of infinite en-
tanglement with E(γ→1)], by considering optimal individual
attacks [under the assumption that Eve can distill a pure en-
tangled state with E(γmin)] we are able to move from insecure
regime to secure regime, and generate non-trivial positive fi-
nite key rates.
So, having access to a maximally entangled state is the
trade-off in order to reach optimality in the teleportation-
based attack without purifying the system, which is the as-
sumption taken for the entangler cloner scheme. Both as-
5sumptions are non-realistic, however, the advantage of this
type of attack compared to the entangling cloner is that it
can be operated in the finite entanglement regime, in which
it outperforms the optimal individual attack. Thus, the all-
optical teleportation attack we introduced in this paper can be
thought of as a universal eavesdropping scheme for Gaussian
QKD, that can be reduced to either optimal individual or opti-
mal collective attack depending on the available entanglement
resources, without assuming Eve has access to the entire en-
vironment.
Finally, the fact that Eve needs an extremely large amount
of entanglement in order to approach the optimal collective
attack showcases the robustness of CV QKD protocols. Inter-
estingly, even the minimum amount of entanglement given in
Eq. (7) is arguably beyond current technological capabilities
[60]. In DV protocols there is no need for a similar (finite en-
tanglement) analysis, since maximally entangled states, i.e.,
Bell states, are not unphysical, and thus the entangling cloner
scheme can operate without any unrealistic assumptions.
Future Directions. Apart from the proposed all-optical
teleportation attack, another possibility for Eve would be to
use the hybrid type of teleportation introduced in Ref. [20].
In this scheme a continuous variable state splits up to N two-
dimensional states (qubits), that can probabilistically be tele-
ported through a DV teleportation protocol (the DV teleporta-
tion should also be adjusted in a measurement-free scheme
similar to Ref. [16]). In this scenario the need for infinite
amount of entanglement of a single state is compensated with
the need of infinite copies of Bell states. With any finite
amount of splitting though, i.e., finite amount of Bell states,
this protocol would simulate a non-Gaussian channel due to
the inevitable truncation of the initial state, so it would be in-
teresting to be investigated if this type of limitation gives any
benefit to the eavesdropper.
Conclusions. In this work, we showed that optimal col-
lective attacks in continuous-variable QKD are always based
on an extremely strong assumption that takes different forms
depending on the way we model the eavesdropper, i.e., full-
system purification, simulation of an identity channel, access
to a resource state with infinite amount of entanglement, ac-
cess to infinite copies of Bell states. However, the requirement
of having access to a resource state with infinite amount of en-
tanglement can be “tamed”, and a teleportation-based scheme
can be modeled that operates in the regime between the op-
timal individual and optimal collective attacks depending on
the available entanglement resources.
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7Supplemental Material
Quantum Teleportation
Quantum teleportation is one of the key tools in quantum information theory, initially introduced for discrete variables [15, 16],
and then extended to CV systems [11, 17, 18] (see also [19] for a universal approach on teleportation).There are also protools
for hybrid situations [20, 21]. The most well-known CV-teleportation protocol was proposed by Braunstein and Kimble (BK98)
[18], which is based on the distributed entanglement between the two parties, and the classically communicated results of Bell-
type measurements performed by one of the two parties. An alternative all-optical teleportation protocol was proposed by Ralph
(R99) [11], where the need of Bell-type measurements is eliminated, using instead a combination of a two-mode squeezer and a
beam-splitter operation.
Let us assume that we want to teleport a (null mean valued) single-mode Gaussian state [27, 39, 43] with covariance matrix σin
from one place (laboratory 1) to another (laboratory 2). Regardless of the teleportation protocol, a necessary quantum resource
in order to achieve that is a two-mode entangled state ρ (for the purposes of this work also Gaussian), shared between the two
laboratories, i.e., a state with a covariance matrix given (in the standard form) by
ρ =

a · c ·
· a · −c
c · b ·
· −c · b
 , (1)
which is a real, symmetric, and positive-definite matrix (we have substituted zero matrix elements with dots “ · ”). Its elements
are proportional to the second-order moments of the quadrature field operators, xˆj := aˆj+ aˆ
†
j and pˆj := i(aˆ
†
j− aˆj), where aˆj and
aˆ†j are the annihilation and creation operators, respectively, with [aˆi, aˆ
†
j ] = δij . The way we manipulate quantum correlations in
order to achieve a successful teleportation depends on the protocol.
The quality of the teleportation protocol is limited by the amount of entanglement that is pre-shared between the two parties,
and perfect teleportation is achieved only in the limit of maximum amount of entanglement resources. In CV systems, though,
maximum entanglement is unphysical, since that would require infinite energy. Thus, realistically, instead of achieving a per-
fect state teleportation, we always end up with a slightly noisy copy of the target state. This process can be modeled as the
decoherence that a quantum channel (completely positive trace-preserving map) induces to a transmitted state [? ? ].
The covariance matrix transformation when a phase-insensitive single-mode Gaussian channel G acts on one arm of a two-
mode Gaussian state σin is given by [43]
σout = G(σin) = (1⊕ U)σin(1⊕ U)T + (0⊕ V ) , (2)
where U =
√
τ1 and V = v1. Significant phase-insensitive Gaussian channels are the following: (i) the lossy channel L with
transmissivity 0 < τ < 1 and noise v = (1 − τ) (pure loss Lp for  = 1, thermal loss for  > 1), (ii) the amplifier channel A
with gain τ > 1 and noise v = (τ − 1) (pure amplifier Ap for  = 1, thermal amplifier for  > 1), (iii) the classical additive
noise channel N with τ = 1 and noise v > 0, and (iv) the identity channelI with τ = 1 and v = 0, representing the ideal
nondecohering channel.
In general, any Gaussian channel can be simulated via a quantum teleportation protocol using an appropriate resource state
[45–47]. Given a Gaussian phase-insensitive channel G the set of resource states that can simulate it have been calculated in
Ref. [48], generalizing previous results [49].
BK98 Teleportation Protocol
In the BK98 protocol one arm of the resource state is mixed with the input state through a balanced beam-splitter in laboratory
1, followed by a Bell-type measurement, i.e., dual homodyne detection (measuring the xˆ quadrature on one arm and the pˆ on
the other), HD, and the results are sent to laboratory 2 through a classical channel, CC. Finally, in laboratory 2, a displacement
operation proportional to the results of these measurements, D, is applied to the other arm of the resource state in order to
reconstruct the input state, i.e., teleport it. Graphically this protocol is depicted in Fig. 1 (a). With a Gaussian resource state of
the form of Eq. (1), this teleportation protocol corresponds to a Gaussian phase-insensitive channel with transmissivity τtel and
noise vtel given by
8FIG. 1. Quantum eleportation protocols. In figure (a) we present the BK98 teleportation protocol via its basic components: (i) the dual
homodyne detection, HD, between the resource state, ρ, and the initial state σin, (ii) the classical channel, CC, (iii) the displacement, D, and
iv) the output state, σout. In figure (b) the R99 teleportation protocol is presented. In this protocol, the basic components are: (i) a two-mode
squeezer Sg , (ii) a beam-splitter Bt, and (iii) the decoherence that the signal has to go through modeled with a quantum channel G.
τtel = λ , (3)
vtel = aλ− 2c
√
λ+ b , (4)
where λ > 0 is the experimentally accessible gain. Note that we assumed an infinite-energy limit in the Bell-type measurement
detection.
R99 Teleportation Protocol
The R99 teleportation protocol was introduced in Ref. [11] and it is graphically presented in Fig. 1 (b). In this protocol one
arm of the resource state is fed into a parametric amplifier along with the input state in laboratory 1. The output amplified signal
is directly sent to laboratory 2, which means that it has to go through some decoherence that can be modeled as a quantum
channel G, that is initially shared between the two laboratories. Finally, in laboratory 2, we mix the signal with the second arm
of the resource state on a beam-splitter, where the induced transmissivity is inversely proportional to the amplification applied
in laboratory 1.
Let us assume that we want to teleport the same state σin as with the BK protocol. In order to do so, we use a two-mode
Gaussian resource state with a covariance matrix ρ of the form of Eq. (1). The initial state can be represented by a combined
four-mode covariance matrix σin ⊕ ρ. The amplification is achieved by a two-mode squeezer [50], where the two inputs are
the initial state and one arm of the resource entangled state. The corresponding symplectic transformation Sg that the amplifier
induces is given by
Sg =

√
g · √g−1 ·
· √g · −√g−1√
g−1 · √g ·
· −√g−1 · √g
·
· 1 ·· 1
 , (5)
where g = cosh2 r > 1, with r ∈ R being the two-mode squeezing parameter. Note that the symplectic transformation Sg is
applied to the initial four-mode state σin ⊕ ρ, where the identity sub-matrix of Sg indicates that the second arm of the resource
state remains unaffected at this stage.
9Applying enough amplification to surpass the quantum limit we end up with a signal that can directly be sent to the other
laboratory, but it still needs to go through some decoherence due to the environment. Let us assume that this decoherence is a
thermal channel G, with transmissivity/gain τ and noise v.
The subsequent attenuation can be modeled with a beam-splitter, where in one port we feed in the previously amplified state
(that is decohered through the environment) and in the other the second arm of the resource entangled state. The symplectic
transformation of the beam-splitter Bt is given by
Bt =

√
t ·
· √t ·
−√1−t ·
· −√1−t
· 1 ·· 1 ·√
1−t ·
· √1−t ·
√
t ·
· √t
 , (6)
with a transmission ratio equal to t = λ/(gτ). Applying on the initial stateσin⊕ρ the two-mode squeezer Sg we get the amplified
state Sg(σin⊕ρ)STg . This amplified state transforms according to Eq. (2) due to the decoherence into G[Sg(σin⊕ρ)STg ]. Finally,
this decohered state goes through the final beam-splitter Bt and evolves into Bt{G[Sg(σin ⊕ ρ)STg ]}BTt . Tracing out mode 2
(the second output of the amplification) and mode 3 (the second output of the attenuation) from this state (see Fig. 1) we get the
output state σout = tr23Bt{G[Sg(σin ⊕ ρ)STg ]}BTt .
This teleportation protocol corresponds to a Gaussian phase-insensitive channel with transmissivity τtel and noise vtel given by
τtel = λ , (7)
vtel = aλ− 2c
√
λ(g − 1)(gτ − λ)
τg2
− λ(aτ + b− v)
τg
+ b . (8)
In the limit of infinite amplification, i.e., g →∞, Eq. (8) reduces to Eq. (4) and the output signal of the R99 protocol becomes
equivalent to that of the BK98 protocol. For finite amplification and the same amount of entanglement resources, the R99
protocol will always correspond to an equally or a slightly more noisy effective channel than the BK98 one, but its big advantage
over the BK98 is that there is no need for individual Bell-type measurements during the teleportation process. The significance
of this advantage is crucial for the results of the main text.
It is worth nothing that in the main text we use the R99 protocol to simulate the exact same channel as the one that represents
the environment, G. Thus, we set λ = τ , which implies that t = 1/g.
